In light of the current situation, what is the level of threat that operators of critical infrastructure face, and are other companies affected as well?

Torsten Hiermann: “The threat situation has changed in recent months and has increased significantly. At the end of september, chancellor Friedrich Merz summed it up: “We are not at war, but we are no longer at peace either.” Malicious manipulation is no longer a marginal phenomenon but rather a strategic method of disrupting economic, political, and social processes. The office for the protection of the constitution and the federal office for civil protection define this approach as deliberately impairing or destroying structures to weaken or influence them. This is not just about “classic” attacks on buildings, but also subtle attacks, such as disruptions to supply chains, targeted espionage, manipulation of public perception, and spreading uncertainty to influence political decision-making or encourage anti-state attitudes.

Therefore, the perpetrator landscape is broad. According to police statistics, left-wing extremist groups in particular tend to carry out attacks on infrastructure and provide instructions on how to build incendiary devices online. We also see state actors working through “proxies,” or recruited helpers who appear inconspicuous at first but are actually pursuing foreign interests. We must also not underestimate the danger from within. Employees who are frustrated or feel unfairly treated can become saboteurs.

Additionally, we are now dealing with hybrid threats. These attacks are not only physical, such as cutting a cable or attacking a transformer station, but also combine cyberattacks, social engineering, and classic physical attacks. Perpetrators intercept data, manipulate processes, or use social media to obtain information. That’s why I say the protection of objects doesn’t end at the fence.

You mentioned the importance of information. Could you elaborate on that?

Torsten Hiermann: Many people underestimate how valuable publicly available information is to a potential attacker. Social media profiles often reveal interesting information: For example, LinkedIn profiles often reveal not only where someone works, but also the projects and technologies they are involved in. This information is an excellent recruitment and evaluation tool for external services. The fact that Google Earth can be used to evaluate the initial vulnerabilities of a location is nothing new.

Added to this is careless handling of internal information. For example: In a critical infrastructure facility, tradespeople and service providers are given a detailed site plan with corresponding facility designations as part of their safety training. This provides potential perpetrators with precise information for planning an attack. This illustrates that protection against saboteurs also requires preventive information protection. What data should I publish? How restrictive should I be when naming contact persons? Is there a social media policy? How do I educate employees so they understand they are part of the security chain?

Drones have recently come into focus as a security risk. How do you see the role of airspace in the overall concept?

Torsten Hiermann: The threat posed by drones has reached a new dimension. They can film, collect reconnaissance data—for example, on processes or response times—record digital signatures, and transport objects and “weapons,” which they can drop. The war in Ukraine has shown how rapidly technology and its applications are advancing.

Nevertheless, I advocate a differentiated approach. Not every company needs to invest in expensive anti-drone systems right away. The key factor is risk analysis. A “normal” production facility without drones poses a lower risk than an energy supplier, chemical plant, airport, or military property, for example. In particular, KRITIS operators must now “take airspace into account” in their security concepts.

Remember that drones often complete their task before being detected. Therefore, the key questions are: How do we detect drones, and how do we respond to them? Rather, the security concept must be thought out from the perspective of the perpetrator. What information will a drone be able to see and access? How can that be prevented “on the ground”?

What specific countermeasures do you recommend in terms of organization and technology?

Torsten Hiermann: It’s about a holistic approach. First, the organizational side: prohibitions on filming and photography on company premises, employee training, and checking vehicles and people for items they are carrying. Access controls must also be reliable and effective. Depending on the level of protection, this may involve biometric procedures. In short, if I don’t check at the gate to see if a service provider is bringing in something undesirable, I don’t need to worry about drones above.

Technically, we have a wide range of options, including perimeter sensors, video surveillance, motion detectors, and tamper-proof devices. Drone detection systems can also be useful. In critical areas, active defense measures, such as jammers or interceptor drones, may be considered. At the same time, however, it’s important to consider resilience, such as redundant power supplies, emergency generators, and secure supply chains. Business continuity is always part of overall protection!

What role does integrated alarm and security management play in this context?

Torsten Hiermann: A crucial one. We can introduce as many individual measures as we like, but if they are not integrated, we will end up with a patchwork again. To create an effective 360-degree security concept, all vectors must be taken into account.

Does that mean that, in the future, all companies—not just KRITIS operators—will have to address attacks more intensively?

Torsten Hiermann: It depends on the risk analysis and the level of protection. A medium-sized mechanical engineering company may not face the same threats as a network operator. However, they can still be crippled by physical or IT attacks. Just think of cyberattacks, disrupted supply chains, or power outages. Production at the Tesla Gigafactory was crippled not by a highly complex operation but by a simple arson attack on a supply line. So, the question is, “How vulnerable am I?” How resilient are my processes? Have I taken precautions to remain operational in the event of an attack or minimize damage?

This is precisely why business continuity is important. Comprehensive protection is about more than just defense; it’s also about preparation. It requires companies to consider not only the physical perimeter but also information protection, social engineering, IT security, and airspace.

Geopolitics, hybrid threats and vulnerable supply chains have made corporate security more strategic than ever. In this interview, Björn Hawlitschka of MACONIA GmbH provides insight into current threat scenarios and practical recommendations.

Mr Hawlitschka, to what extent are companies more exposed to geopolitical risks today than they were ten years ago?

Björn Hawlitschka: I studied political science and then worked for a long time at the Federal Academy for Security Policy. Even then, we were working with an expanded concept of security in which networking and strategic thinking played a major role. Today we can clearly see that geopolitical risks have become more complex. In the past, companies could afford the luxury of keeping IT and security strictly separate. Conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, the pandemic and supply chain issues have shown us how vulnerable our systems are. It only takes one freighter stuck in the Suez Canal to bring entire production chains to a standstill.

Why are critical infrastructures and companies increasingly being targeted by states or non-state actors?

Björn Hawlitschka: On the one hand, we see classic, economically motivated cybercrime – such as the Darkside attack on the Colonial Pipeline in 2021. On the other hand, politically motivated sabotage is also on the rise. Both are dangerous. It becomes particularly perfidious when attacks take on hybrid forms, combining physical and digital sabotage. The motives range from economic blackmail to the deliberate destabilisation of entire societies.

Which sectors are particularly at risk, and which threat scenarios do you see as most critical at the moment?

Björn Hawlitschka:Traditional industries such as energy, chemicals and technology are of course in the spotlight. But small and medium-sized enterprises or municipal institutions are also vulnerable, for example to ransomware. It is particularly critical if social services can no longer be paid out in the event of such attacks. This undermines trust in government and can exacerbate social tensions.

Do you see a trend towards targeted hybrid threats, i.e. a combination of physical sabotage and cyberattacks?

Björn Hawlitschka: Absolutely. In Ukraine, we have already seen a combination of cyber attacks and physical sabotage in 2015. This type of threat will increase because it is particularly effective.

What basic security measures should companies take to protect themselves against digital threats?

Björn Hawlitschka:A solid risk analysis that maps all business processes is important. This includes a business impact analysis: Which processes are most critical? How long can they be down? And patch management! This sounds banal, but many vulnerabilities arise because available security updates have not been installed. Employee awareness also plays a major role – after all, people are both the biggest vulnerability and the most important resource.

How can physical security measures be effectively integrated with cyber defence strategies?

Björn Hawlitschka: The zero-trust approach is very helpful here – not only in IT, but also physically: don’t blindly trust anyone, even if they are in the building. Awareness has to be trained in all areas. Many companies protect the outer ring very well – but once someone is inside, they can move around freely. That is a risk.

Are there any best practices or specific examples from the corporate world that can serve as models for security strategies?

Björn Hawlitschka:Microsoft’s Zero Trust model is a good example. Or Toyota, which revised its supply chain strategies after Fukushima and is now planning with more redundancy. It is important not just to react, but to learn from crises.

What measures would you recommend to companies that are at the beginning of a professional security strategy?

Björn Hawlitschka: The first step is to know your own processes. If you don’t know what your “castle” looks like, you can’t protect it. Then comes a business impact analysis. And finally, you should carry out realistic emergency exercises. Red team tests – i.e. external attacks to identify vulnerabilities – are also highly recommended.

How should companies deal with the challenge that security measures are often seen as a cost factor rather than an investment?

Björn Hawlitschka: I recommend two calculation models: Firstly, how much would real damage cost? Second, what business will I miss out on if I don’t have certifications or ISMS/BCM systems in place? More and more customers, especially in the banking sector, are demanding proof of security. If you have nothing to show, you will lose business.

What physical security measures are particularly important for companies with distributed locations or hybrid working models?

Björn Hawlitschka: If there are several sites, it should be clearly defined who is responsible in which situation – especially at what level of severity the “head office” takes over: Already in an emergency or only in a crisis? This requires defined escalation levels. And, of course, regular emergency drills – both local and central. The important thing to remember is that even small incidents can have a big impact. That’s why preparation is everything.

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